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Abstract. Among many submissions to the NIST post-quantum cryp-
tography (PQC) project, NewHope is a promising key encapsulation
mechanism (KEM) based on the Ring-Learning with errors (Ring-LWE)
problem. Since the most important factors to be considered for PQC
are security and cost including bandwidth and time/space complexity,
in this paper, by doing exact noise analysis and using Bose Chaudhuri
Hocquenghem (BCH) codes, it is shown that the security and bandwidth
efficiency of NewHope can be substantially improved. In detail, the de-
cryption failure rate (DFR) of NewHope is recalculated by performing
exact noise analysis, and it is shown that the DFR of NewHope has been
too conservatively calculated. Since the recalculated DFR is much lower
than the required 2−128, this DFR margin is exploited to improve the
security up to 8.5 % or the bandwidth efficiency up to 5.9 % without
changing the procedure of NewHope.
The additive threshold encoding (ATE) used in NewHope is a sim-
ple error correcting code (ECC) robust to side channel attack, but its
error-correction capability is relatively weak compared with other ECCs.
Therefore, if a proper error-correction scheme is applied to NewHope, ei-
ther security or bandwidth efficiency or both can be improved. Among
various ECCs, BCH code has been widely studied for its application to
cryptosystems due to its advantages such as no error floor problem. In
this paper, the ATE and total noise channel are regarded as a super
channel from an information-theoretic viewpoint. Based on this super
channel analysis, various concatenated coding schemes of ATE and BCH
code for NewHope have been investigated. Through numerical analysis,
it is revealed that the security and bandwidth efficiency of NewHope are
substantially improved by using the proposed error-correction schemes.
Keywords: Bandwidth Efficiency · BCH Code · Decryption Failure
Rate · Error Correcting Codes · NewHope · NIST · Post-Quantum Cryp-
tography · Security
? Supported by X.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
07
84
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
0 M
ay
 20
19
2 M. Song et al.
1 Introduction
Current public-key algorithms based on integer decomposition, discrete loga-
rithm, and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems (e.g, RSA and elliptic
curve encryption) have been unlikely to be broken by currently available tech-
nology. However, with the help of upcoming quantum computing technology
such as Shor’s quantum algorithm for integer factorization, current public-key
algorithms can be easily broken. For that reason, in order to avoid the secu-
rity problem of future network, new public-key algorithms called post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) should be developed to replace the existing public-key al-
gorithms. Therefore, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
has recently begun a PQC project to identify and evaluate post-quantum public-
key algorithms secure against quantum computing [1]. Among the various PQC
candidates, lattice-based cryptosystems have become one of the most promis-
ing candidate algorithms for post-quantum key exchange. Lattice-based cryp-
tosystems have been developed based on worst-case assumptions about lattice
problems that are believed to be resistant to quantum computing. Among vari-
ous lattice problems, learning with errors (LWE) problem introduced by Regev
in 2005 [2] has been widely analyzed and used. Furthermore, the Ring-LWE
problem presented by Lynbashevsky, Peikert, and Regev in 2010 [3], which im-
proves the computational and implementation efficiency of LWE, has also been
widely used [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. NewHope has been proposed by Alkim, Ducas,
Po¨ppelmann, Schwabe [9], [10] which is one of the various cryptosystems based
on Ring-LWE. NewHope has attracted a lot of attention [11], [12], [13] and it
was verified in an experiment of Google [14]. The key reasons that NewHope at-
tracts so much attention are the use of simple and practical noise distribution, a
centered binomial distribution, and a proper choice of ring parameters for better
performance and security.
NewHope is an indistinguishability (IND)-chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)
secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that exchanges the shared secret key
based on the IND-chosen plaintext attack (CPA) secure public-key encryption
(PKE). Note that the IND-CPA PKE can be transformed into the IND-CCA
KEM using Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [15]. The IND-CCA secure KEM
obtained by applying FO transform to IND-CPA secure PKE requires a very low
decryption failure rate (DFR) because an attacker can exploit the decryption
error [15]. Therefore, the DFR in NewHope should be lower than 2−128 to make
sure of resilience against attacks that exploit decryption errors. As in Frodo [5]
and Kyber [6], this study aims to achieve the DFR lower than 2−140 to allow
enough margin in NewHope.
The DFR of NewHope is most influenced by the noise parameter k of cen-
tered binomial distribution and modulus q, and is also closely related to an error
correcting code (ECC). NewHope uses an additive threshold encoding (ATE)
as an ECC, which is almost similar to the repetition code used in digital com-
munication systems [16]. In addition, ATE has an advantage of being robust to
the side channel attack, but ATE inherently has much worse error-correction
capability than other ECCs such as Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem (BCH) code,
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low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, and turbo codes [17], [18]. In [13], it was
shown that by applying more powerful ECC to NewHope instead of ATE, the
DFR can be improved. It is also shown that the security can be improved and
the size of ciphertext can be reduced by using the improved DFR obtained by
using ECC.
Contribution The contributions of this paper is divided into six categories.
-Exact Noise Analysis of NewHope NewHope can be understood as
a digital communication system. Bob and Alice are transmitter and receiver,
respectively, and the 256-bit shared secret key is a message bit stream. The
difference between the ATE output v and the received signal v′′ distorted by
many factors can be modeled as a digital communication channel. We analyze
all the noise sources of this channel and numerically calculate the exact noise
distribution of NewHope.
-Recalculation of DFR of NewHope The DFR of NewHope is recalcu-
lated as 2−474 and 2−431 for n = 1024 and n = 512, respectively, based pm the
exact noise analysis and theoretical analysis of ATE. New DFR values show that
the DFR of NewHope has been too conservatively calculated.
-Improvement of Security and Bandwidth Efficiency of NewHope
Using New DFR Margin Since the recalculated DFR is much lower than the
required 2−140, this DFR margin is exploited to improve the security by 8.5 %
or bandwidth efficiency by 5.9 % without changing the procedure of NewHope.
If a slight increase in time/space complexity is allowed, the bandwidth efficiency
can be improved by 23.5 %.
-An Information-theoretic View of Noise in NewHope as a Super
Channel The ATE and total noise of NewHope can be regarded as a super
channel from an information-theoretic viewpoint. For various concatenated cod-
ing schemes of ATE and BCH code for NewHope, super channel is defined. We
perform exact analysis of super channel for each concatenated coding schemes
by using exact analysis of noise and ATE.
-Proposed Concatenated Coding Schemes The ATE used in NewHope
is simple and robust to the side channel attack. However, since ATE is based
on the repetition code, it shows low error-correction capability. In order to im-
prove the security and bandwidth efficiency, advanced ECCs should be applied
to NewHope. BCH codes are suitable for PQC because they do not show an
error floor problem and can be analyzed by deriving an upper bound of block
error rate (BLER). Based on extensive simulations, we select four concatenated
coding schemes of ATE and BCH code to combine the advantages of these two
ECCs.
-Analysis of Security and Bandwidth Efficiency of NewHope with
the Proposed Error-correction Schemes The results of numerical analysis
show that the proposed concatenated coding schemes of ATE and BCH code
can improve the security level by 21.5 % or reduce the ciphertext size by 41.5
% while achieving the required DFR 2−140 for NewHope with n = 1024. Also,
for NewHope with n = 512, the proposed concatenated coding schemes can
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improve the security level by 22.8 % or reduce the ciphertext size by 35.3 %
while achieving the required DFR 2−140.
The contributions of this paper differ from the contributions of [13] in three
ways. First, we interpret NewHope as a communication system over noisy chan-
nel from an information-theoretic view, and hence a super channel is defined and
analyzed in performing exact analysis of noise and ATE. Based on this analy-
sis, we recalculate the exact DFR of NewHope. Second, we show that by using
the recalculated DFR, the security and bandwidth efficiency of NewHope can
be improved without changing the procedure of NewHope. Finally, compared
with [13], we numerically evaluate more various compression rates of ciphertext
using the super channel analysis. Through this evaluation, we present many ef-
fective compression rates show that better performance in reducing the size of
the ciphertext and decreasing show lower DFR.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 NewHope
Parameters There are three important parameters in NewHope: n, q, and k.
The dimension n = 512 or 1024 for NewHope guarantees the security properties
of Ring-LWE and enables efficient number theoretic transform (NTT) [19]. The
modulus q = 12289 is determined to support security and efficient NTT, and is
closely related with the bandwidth. The noise parameter k = 8 is the parameter
of centered binomial distribution, which determines the noise strength and hence
directly affects the security and DFR [4].
Notations Let Rq = Zq[x]/(Xn+ 1) be the ring of integer polynomials modulo
Xn + 1 where each coefficient is reduced modulo q. Let a
$←− χ be the sampling
of a ∈ Rq following the probability distribution χ over Rq. Let ψk denote the
centered binomial distribution with parameter k, which is practically realized by∑k−1
i=0 (bi − b′i), where bi and b′i are uniformly and independently sampled from
{0, 1}. The variance of ψk is k/2 [4]. a ◦ b denotes the coefficient-wise product of
polynomials a and b.
NewHope Protocol NewHope is a lattice-based KEM for Alice (Server) and
Bob (Client) to share 256-bit secret key with each other. The protocol of NewHope
is briefly expressed based on Fig. 1 as follows, where the functions are the same
ones as defined in [4].
Step 1) seed
$←− {0, 1, . . . , 255}32 denotes a uniformly sampling of 32 byte
arrays (corresponding to 256 bits) with 32 integer elements selected between 0
and 255 by using a random number generator. Then SHAKE256(l, d), a strong
hash function [20], takes an integer l that specifies the number of output bytes
and an data byte array d as inputs. In NewHope, z ← SHAKE256(64, seed)
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Fig. 1: NewHope Protocol.
denotes that 32 byte arrays seed are hashed to generate a pseudorandom 64 byte
arrays z with 64 integer elements uniformly selected between 0 and 255. Then
GenA expands the pseudorandom 32 byte arrays z[0 : 31] using SHAKE128
hash function [20] to generate the polynomial aˆ ∈ Rq where z[0 : 31] is the first
32 byte arrays of z. Since aˆ is generated from the seed sampled from a uniform
distribution, the coefficients of aˆ also follow a uniform distribution on [0, q − 1].
Step 2) Generate polynomials (s, s′, e, e′, e′′ ∈ Rq) whose coefficients are
sampled from the centered binomial distribution ψk. The polynomials (s, s
′, e)
are transformed to (sˆ, tˆ, eˆ), respectively, by applying NTT for efficient polyno-
mial multiplication. Then Alice transforms the secret key (sˆ) into byte arrays
using EncodePolynomial(), which converts the polynomial (sˆ) into 2048 byte
arrays.
Step 3) Alice creates a public key (pk) by converting bˆ = aˆ◦ sˆ+ eˆ and z[0 : 31]
into 1824 byte arrays using EncodePK(), and transmits (pk) to Bob. Then Bob
transforms the received public key (pk) into (bˆ, z[0 : 31]) using DecodePK(),
and creates (aˆ), which is the same (aˆ) generated in Step 1.
Step 4) A 256-bit shared secret key (µ) is created by performing ATE encod-
ing.
Step 5) Generate a ciphertext (uˆ, v′) using the public key and v.
Step 6) To efficiently reduce bandwidth, compression is performed on the co-
efficients of v′ to generate the polynomial h, and then the ciphertext polynomials
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(uˆ, h) are transformed into the byte arrays c using EncodeC(), and c is trans-
mitted to Alice. Alice performs decompression on hˆ to restore v′. However, this
restored polynomial v′decomp is different from v
′ generated in Step 5, due to the
compression and decompression. Alice creates v′′ using the received ciphertext c
and sk generated in Step 2. Each coefficient of v′′ is a sum of the corresponding
coefficient of v and noise. Note that v′′ is not a polynomial used in NewHope,
for easy explanation of the results in this paper, v′′ is added in Fig. 1.
Step 7) The 256-bit shared secret key (µ) is recovered (or decrypted) from
the coefficients of v′′ by performing ATE decoding.
2.2 BCH Codes
BCH codes are algebraic block codes widely used in digital communications and
storage systems. Unlike other advanced ECCs such as low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes and Turbo codes, BCH codes do not show an error floor problem
and thus can achieve the required DFR (≈ 2−140) [17], [18]. Also, BCH codes
can be theoretically analyzed whether the required DFR is achieved or not.
Therefore, BCH codes are ECCs suitable for PQC In addition, various research
activities [7], [13], [21], [22], [23] are currently underway to apply BCH codes to
the cryptosystem.
A BCH code is usually denoted by BCH(Cn, Ck, Ct) where Cn is the code
length, Ck is the dimension, and Ct is the error-correction capability. The code
length Cn of the primitive Cq-ary BCH code is C
m
q − 1,m = 3, 4, ..., and the
code length can be adjusted by applying many modification methods such as
shortening and puncturing. The dimension Ck denotes the number of message
symbols in a codeword and Ct is the maximum number of errors that are always
corrected [17], [18].
3 Improving NewHope Based on Exact Noise Analysis
and DFR Recalculation
3.1 An Information-theoretic View of NewHope
In order to properly apply ECC to NewHope and facilitate analysis, it is nec-
essary to understand the protocol of NewHope via an information-theoretic ap-
proach. For NewHope, the mapping Z2 → R2 and the mapping R2 → Z2 can
be regarded as encoding and decoding of ECC, respectively. Also, the mapping
R2 → Rq and Rq → R2 can be regarded as modulation and demodulation,
respectively. Then NewHope can be understood as a digital communication sys-
tem as follows. Bob and Alice are transmitter and receiver, respectively, and
the 256-bit shared secret key (µ) is a message bit stream. Also, the process of
transmitting and receiving messages (Steps 4, 5, 6, and 7) can be viewed as a
digital communication channel. In more detail, the transmitter (Bob) generates
a 256-bit message bit stream, encodes this massage, modulates the codeword
bits to the symbols of Zq and transmits the resulting signal (Step 4). At the
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receiver (Alice), the received signal through the noisy channel is demodulated
and decoded (Step 7). For NewHope, a process of adding the compression noise
and the difference noise generated in Steps 5 and 6 can be regarded as noisy
communication channel. This overall process in Steps 4-7 can be described as a
digital communication system shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: An information-theoretic view of NewHope as a digital communication
system n = 512 or n = 1024.
In Fig. 2, µenc is the resulting signal after applying ATE to µ, and nt rep-
resents the overall noise generated in Steps 5 and 6, which is called the total
noise. Since ATE simultaneously performs demodulation and decoding, demod-
ulation and decoding are combined into one block. After interpreting NewHope
as a digital communication system, the DFR in NewHope is equivalent to the
block error rate (BLER), i.e., Pr(µ 6= µ′), in a digital communication system.
Therefore, in order to accurately calculate the DFR of NewHope, exact analysis
of the noisy channel is required.
3.2 Exact Noise Analysis of NewHope and DFR Recalculation
Difference Noise, Compression Noise, and Total Noise Analysis Total
noise nt is defined as the noise contained in the received 256-bit shared secret
key before demodulation. Total noise of the ith coefficient nt,i of the polynomial
v′′ in Step 6 is represented as follows.
nt,i = (v
′′ − v)i (1)
= (v′decomp − us− v)i (2)
= (v′ + nc − us− v)i (3)
= (bs′ + e′′ − ass′ − e′s)i + nc,i (4)
= (es′ − e′s+ e′′)i + nc,i (5)
= nd,i + nc,i (6)
where (·)i denotes the ith coefficient of polynomial, nc ∈ Rq is the compression
noise polynomial, nc,i is the ith coefficient of compression noise polynomial in
v′′, and nd,i is the ith coefficient of difference noise polynomial in v′′.
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To analyze the compression noise nc,i, we first need to investigate the co-
efficient of the polynomial v′ = ass′ + es′ + e′′ being compressed, where the
coefficients of s, s′, e, and e′′ follow the predetermined centered binomial distri-
bution. However, since the coefficients of polynomial a follow a uniform distri-
bution, the coefficient of the compressed polynomial h will eventually follow a
uniform distribution. A compression to v′ is performed by applying bv′i∗rv′/qe to
the coefficients v′i of v
′ to obtain a polynomial h, where b·e is rounding function
that rounds to the closest integer, rv′ denotes the compression rate on v
′, and
rv′ = 8 for NewHope. Then the range of the compressed coefficients hi of h is
changed from [0, q− 1] to [0, rv′ − 1] so that the number of bits required to store
a coefficient is reduced from 14 bits (= dlog2 qe) for v′ to 3 bits (= dlog2 rv′e)
for h. A decompression is performed by applying bhi ∗ q/rv′e to each of the co-
efficients of h. Then the coefficient takes the value from 0, bq/rv′e,b2q/rv′e . . . ,
b(rv′ − 1) · q/rv′e. This compression and decompression are illustrated in Fig. 3,
where the coefficients v′i of v
′ from different patterns (or ranges) are mapped to
different vdecomp,i values through compression and decompression. In the end,
compression and decompression can be seen as a rounding operation. Therefore,
the compression noise is inevitably generated with the maximum magnitude
bq/2rv′c and the distribution of the compression noise is derived as follows:
nc[x] =

q/rv′ , 0 ≤ x ≤ d q2rv′ e − 1
0, otherwise
q/rv′ q − 2− d q2r e ≤ x ≤ q − 1
(7)
Fig. 3: Mapping corresponding to each of compression and decompression in
NewHope.
In total noise, nd,i = (es
′ − e′s + e′′)i is defined as the ith coefficient of the
difference noise polynomial where the coefficients of e, e′, e′′, s, and s′ follow
the same centered binomial distribution. In order to derive the distribution of
difference noise, a number of convolution operations are required because the
difference noise is a sum of many random variables, each of which is obtained by
multiplying two random variables that follow the centered binomial distribution.
However, since it is difficult to calculate the multiple convolutions of the above
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distribution in closed form, the distribution of difference noise is numerically
calculated [13].
Total noise is a sum of compression noise and difference noise which are
independently generated. Thus, the distribution of total noise is obtained by
performing convolution of the distributions of compression noise and difference
noise as shown in Fig. 4.
𝑥 ∈ ℤ𝑞
Fig. 4: Distributions of total noise, compression noise, and difference noise of
NewHope (Distribution of total noise, compression noise, and difference noise is
symmetric with respect to b q2c and q = 12289).
If a process of compression on uˆ is added to NewHope, total noise nt,i is
modified as follows.
nt,i = nd,i + nc,i − (nus)i (8)
where nu ∈ Rq is the compression noise polynomial generated while the com-
pression and decompression to uˆ.
The coefficients of the polynomial uˆ = aˆ◦ tˆ+NTT (e′) follow a uniform distri-
bution because the coefficients of aˆ follow a uniform distribution. A compression
to uˆ is performed by applying baˆ · ruˆ/qe to the coefficients uˆi of uˆ, where ruˆ
denotes the compression rate on uˆ and uˆ = q for NewHope.
Fig. 5 shows the total noise distribution for the various compression rates of
rv′ and ruˆ. Note that the total compression noise of NewHope is obtained by
(rv′ = 8, ruˆ = q). uˆ cannot be compressed as much as v
′ because the compression
noise of uˆ is multiplied by s to affect total noise as shown in (8).
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𝑥 ∈ ℤ𝑞
^
^
^
Fig. 5: Distributions of total noise for various compression rates on v′ and uˆ
(n = 1024).
DFR Recalculation The DFR of NewHope calculated in [4] is defective be-
cause the compression noise nc is not considered and the centered binomial
distribution is approximated by Gaussian distribution. In addition, ATE is not
considered, which clearly affects the DFR of NewHope, and an upper bound
of the DFR is derived using the Chernoff-Cramer bound instead of doing ex-
act calculation [4], [9]. Also, instead of calculating Pr(µ′ 6= µ) of Fig. 2 as
DFR, Pr(vi 6= v′′i ) of Fig. 2 was calculated. Therefore, current DFR values of
NewHope, which are DFR < 2−213 for n = 512 and DFR < 2−216 for n = 1024,
are not correct and hence it is necessary to recalculate accurate DFR values of
NewHope based on exact noise analysis.
To recalculate the DFR of NewHope, it is assumed that the coefficients of
polynomials are statistically independent to each other because it is shown by
experiments in [13] that there is almost no influence on DFR by the correlation
of coefficients. Since it is typical to give a margin to the target DFR, the DFR
requirement is usually set to 2−140 instead of 2−128.
In the previous section, the total noise nt is thoroughly analyzed. In NewHope,
ATE is used to encode and decode a message bit µi, and the encoding (including
modulation) and decoding (including demodulation) procedures of ATE with m
repetitions are shown in Fig 6 [16]. The encoding/modulation of ATE is per-
formed such that one message bit µi is repeated m times and each of them is
mapped to the element of Zq (usually either 0 or b q2c) as the coefficients of v.
The demodulation/decoding of ATE sums up the m absolute values of the dif-
ferences of q2 and the m received coefficient values of v
′′ corresponding to the m
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repeated coefficients. Then, the sum v′′s is compared with m · q/4 to determine
whether the message bit µi is 0 or 1 as follows.
v′′s
1
≷
0
m · q
4
(9)
Compared with the repetition code, ATE has the same encoding/modulation
process, but uses different demodulation/decoding which is simple and effective
because the square operation is not required for demodulation/decoding. There-
fore, although the error-correction capability of ATE is worse than those of other
advanced ECCs, ATE still works well as an ECC for PQC such as NewHope.
Fig. 6: Encoding and decoding of ATE for NewHope.
Pr(µ′i 6= µi) is called bit error rate (BER) of µi for i = 0, 1, . . . , 255 as follow.
First, the error distribution Pv′′ of v
′′
i is calculate as follow.
Pv′′ = Pr
( ∣∣∣v′′i − bq2c∣∣∣ < m · q4 | vi = bq2c)Pr(vi = bq2c) (10)
+Pr
( ∣∣∣v′′i − bq2c∣∣∣ ≥ m · q4 | vi = 0)Pr(vi = 0) (11)
Second, the error distribution Pµ′ of µi is calculated as follow.
Pµ′ = Pv′′ ⊗ Pv′′ ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pv′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
(12)
where ⊗ is the convolution operation and the range of Pµ′ is [0,m · q − 1]. Let
BERm be BER when the ATE with m repetition is used. BERm is calculated
as follow.
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BERm = Pµ′
(
x <
m · q
4
)
Pr(µi = 1) + Pµ′
(
x ≥ m · q
4
)
Pr(µi = 0) (13)
where Pr(µi = 0) = Pr(µi = 1) =
1
2 .
Since we assume that the coefficients of polynomial v′′ are independent,
Pr(µ′i 6= µi) = Pr(µ′j 6= µj) for i, j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Therefore, BLER, which
is in fact the DFR, of ATE with m repetitions in NewHope is calculated as
1− (1−BERm)256.
Based on the above analysis, the DFR of NewHope is recalculated as 2−474
and 2−431 for n = 1024 and n = 512, respectively. These DFR values are much
smaller than the corresponding DFR values 2−216 and 2−213 from the NewHope
specification [4]. Therefore, it is possible to improve the security and bandwidth
efficiency of NewHope only by utilizing this DFR margin.
3.3 Improved Security and Bandwidth Efficiency of NewHope
Based on Recalculated DFR
Improved Security Since there exists a trade-off relation between security level
and DFR, it is necessary to properly select the noise parameter k of centered
binomial distribution such that the security level and the DFR are appropriately
determined. Even if NewHope is designed to have an extremely low DFR, the
security level can be more improved by using new DFR margin obtained from
recalculated DFR.
Table 1: Improved security level of NewHope based on new DFR margin (noise
parameter k = 8 for current NewHope).
n k DFR
Cost of primal attack
Classical/Quantum [bits]
Cost of dual attack
Classical/Quantum [bits]
1024
8 ≈ 2−474 259/235 257/233
15 ≈ 2−145 280/254 279/253
512
8 ≈ 2−431 112/101 112/101
14 ≈ 2−154 121/110 121/110
Table 1 shows the improved security levels which are calculated by assuming
cost of the primal attack and dual attack [24] to NewHope. It is possible to
improve the security level by 8.0 % (n = 1024, k = 15) and 8.9 % (n = 512,
k = 14) while keeping the required DFR of 2−140 compared with the current
NewHope. Note that such security level improvement does not require too much
increase of time/space complexity in NewHope because it only changes the noise
parameter k without any additional process.
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Improved Bandwidth Efficiency The bandwidth efficiency of NewHope can
also be improved by utilizing new DFR margin. An improvement of bandwidth
efficiency is achieved by reducing the ciphertext size which, however, increases
the compression noise resulting in the DFR degradation. However, even with
such increased compression noise, both the improvement of bandwidth efficiency
and the required DFR of 2−140 can be achieved by utilizing DFR margin.
Table 2: Improved bandwidth efficiency of NewHope based on new DFR margin.
n (rv′ , ruˆ) Ciphertext reduction (%) DFR
1024
(8,q) 0 (Current NewHope) ≈ 2−474
(4,q) 5.9 ≈ 2−227
(8, 1024) 23.5 ≈ 2−199
512
(8,q) 0 (Current NewHope) ≈ 2−431
(4,q) 5.9 ≈ 2−420
(4, 2048) 23.5 ≈ 2−155
(8, 1024) 23.5 ≈ 2−185
Table 2 shows the improved bandwidth efficiency of NewHope achieved by
additional ciphertext compression. The results in Table 2 are obtained in two
ways. The first way (rv′ = 4, ruˆ = q) changes only the compression rate on
v′ from 8 (3 bits per coefficient) to 4 (2 bits per coefficient) to improve the
bandwidth efficiency, which does not change the protocol of NewHope and hence
does not increase the time/space complexity. The second way (the remaining
results) is to improve the bandwidth efficiency by doing additional compression
on both uˆ and v′, which results in a slight increase of time/space complexity
because compression of uˆ is added to the NewHope protocol. However, the second
way shows about four times improvement in bandwidth efficiency over the first
way while keeping the target DFR.
4 Improving Security and Bandwidth Efficiency of
NewHope Using Error-correction Schemes
ECCs are used to format the transmitted information so as to protect the in-
formation from the noisy channel. Such protection is obtained by adding sys-
tematic redundancy to the information, which enables the receiver to detect and
possibly correct errors. Therefore, ECCs are an essential part of digital commu-
nication/storage systems.
ATE is used in NewHope as an ECC, which was proposed by Po¨ppelmann and
Gu¨neysu [16] However, since ATE is based on the repetition code, it shows low
error-correction capability. Therefore, by applying advanced ECC to NewHope,
the security and bandwidth efficiency can be significantly improved.
There are various good-performing ECCs such as turbo codes, LDPC codes,
and BCH codes. Turbo codes provide good error-correction performance close
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to the Shannon limit and the implementation of encoder is rather simple. LDPC
codes also show good error-correction performance and enable high-speed pro-
cessing. However, it is difficult to estimate low BLER of turbo codes and LDPC
codes because they commonly have an error floor problem and no analytic way
to accurately estimate very low BLER. In contrast, BCH codes do not show
error-correction performance close to the Shannon limit but low BLER can be
analyzed by calculating an upper bound of BLER. Also, BCH codes do not show
an error floor problem. Therefore, BCH codes can be a better choice for PQC
because a very low DFR is required for PQC. In this section, we investigate
concatenated coding schemes of ATE and BCH code to combine the advantages
of ATE and BCH code. However, the use of BCH codes is accompanied by an
increase of implementation complexity and a possibility of side channel attacks.
Nevertheless we focus on theoretically investigating how much the security and
bandwidth efficiency of NewHope can be improved by using ECCs rather than
dealing with the implementation issues. Note that implementation issues such as
constant-time ECC [21] and robustness to the side channel attacks are actively
studied research topics.
Fig. 7: An information-theoretic view of NewHope in terms of ECC and super
channel.
From the viewpoint of ECC, the output of encoder and the input into decoder
should be well defined, and hence the modulation, channel, and demodulation
can be regarded as a super channel between them as shown in Fig. 7. Note that
this super channel is a binary symmetric channel (BSC). Then we can easily
calculate the BLER (DFR) of NewHope with ECC after we obtain the cross-
over probability of super channel by applying the total noise analysis.
4.1 Candidates of Error-correction Schemes
After analyzing various concatenated coding schemes for NewHope, we select
the following four options (or ECCs) to validate the role of ECCs in NewHope.
Note that these four options do not mean the best ECCs but they can show that
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NewHope or other lattice-based cryptosystems can be dramatically improved in
terms of security, bandwidth, and DFR by using ECCs even if there are still
some implementation problems to be solved. As the BCH codes used in four
options, first, narrow-sense primitive BCH codes having the dimension equal to
or similar to 256 and the code length equal to or similar to b nmc for m = 1, 2, and
3 are considered. Second, shortened BCH codes satisfying the above conditions
are considered.
For all four options, BCH code is used as an outer code outside the super
channel and ATE is used as an inner code for encoding/modulation and decod-
ing/demodulation inside the super channel as given in Fig. 7.
- Option 1
Inner code: ATE(3-Repetition) + Outer code: BCH(341,260,9)
Parameters: Cn = 341, m = b nCn c = 3
A 256-bit message µ is encoded by BCH (341, 260, 9) which is the shortened
code of BCH(511,430,9). This encoder requires 260 bits as its input, while the
size of message in NewHope is 256 bits. Therefore, the input into the encoder
is generated by padding four zeros to the 256-bit message µ. Then, the 341-bit
BCH codeword becomes the input into the ATE. The 1023-bit output of ATE
(m = 3) and the additional zero are used as 1024 coefficients to generate v. With
Option 1, up to 9 bit errors are corrected.
- Option 2
Inner code: ATE(2-Repetition) + Outer code: BCH(511,259,30)
Parameters: Cn = 511, m = b nCn c = 2
BCH(511,259,30) is a narrow-sense primitive BCH code and by padding three
zeros to the 256-bit message µ, the input into the BCH encoder is generated.
Also, the input of ATE encoder is generated by padding one zero to the 511-bit
BCH codeword. With Option 2, up to 30 bit errors are corrected.
- Option 3
Inner code: ATE(1-Repetition) + Outer code: BCH(1023,258,106)
Parameters: Cn = 1023, m = b nCn c = 1
BCH(1023,258,106) is a narrow-sense primitive BCH code and by padding two
zeros to the 256-bit message µ, the input into the BCH encoder is generated.
Also, the input of ATE encoder is generated by padding one zero to the 1023-bit
BCH codeword. With Option 3, up to 106 bit errors are corrected.
- Option 4
Inner code: ATE(1-Repetition) + Outer code: BCH(511,259,30)
Parameters: Cn = 511, m = b nCn c = 1
Option 4 is used for NewHope with n = 512. By adding three zeros to the 256-bit
message µ, the input into the BCH encoder is generated. Also, the input of ATE
encoder is generated by padding one zero to the 511-bit BCH codeword. With
Option 4, up to 30 bit errors are corrected.
The repetition number m of ATE affects the cross-over probability of super
channel in Fig. 7. Obviously, the larger the repetition number m of ATE, the
lower the cross-over probability of super channel. Table 3 shows the cross-over
probability of super channel according to the repetition number of ATE, which
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Table 3: Cross-over probability of super channel for Options 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Option ATE Cross-over probability of super channel
NewHope m = 4 1.3277× 10−145
Option 1 m = 3 8.3884× 10−110
Option 2 m = 2 6.0045× 10−74
Option 3 m = 1 5.1119× 10−38
Option 4 m = 1 1.7993× 10−67
is calculated by using (13) with m =1, 2, 3, and 4. However, as the repetition
number m of ATE increases, the code rate of BCH code also increases and hence
the error-correction capability of BCH code degrades. Note that for NewHope
with m = 4, the cross-over probability is the same as the DFR because there
is no outer code. In summary, there exists a trade-off between the repetition
number m of ATE (i.e., the quality of super channel) and the error-correction
capability of BCH code (outer code). Therefore, it is very important to determine
the optimum repetition number m of ATE and the error-correction capability of
BCH code by investigating this trade-off.
In general, decoding of BCH codes is performed by the Berlekamp-Massey
(BM) algorithm and the decoding complexity increases linearly with the error-
correction capability Ct. Therefore, in terms of implementation complexity Op-
tion 1 is the best choice because it has the lowest decoding complexity among
four options.
4.2 Bandwidth Efficiency and DFR for Various Compression Rates
on v′ and uˆ
We consider various compression rates (rv′ ,ruˆ) on v
′ and uˆ as given in Table 4.
The reason for choosing these compression rates is that the target DFR 2−140
for NewHope cannot be achieved only by using ATE due to the increased com-
pression noise as can be seen from Table 4. Table 4 also shows the ciphertext
size and DFR when each compression rate is applied to NewHope where the ci-
phertext size is calculated as n8 (dlog2 rv′e+dlog2 ruˆe). Therefore, we can check if
the target DFR can be achieved by applying Options 1, 2, 3, and 4 to NewHope
with these compression rates. Note that the ciphertext size reduction is related
to compression noise, so it affects DFR and does not affect security.
If a BCH(Cn, Ck, Ct) is used, the DFR (or BLER) of NewHope over the
super channel (or BSC) in Fig. 7 with the cross-over probability p is calculated
as
DFR = 1−
Ct∑
i=0
(
Cn
i
)
pi(1− p)Cn−i. (14)
Table 5 shows the DFR and ciphertext size (or improvement of bandwidth
efficiency) reduction of NewHope with n = 1024 when Options 1, 2, and 3 are
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Table 4: Various compression rates on v′ and uˆ and the corresponding size of
ciphertext and DFR ((8,q) is the compression rate of current NewHope).
n (rv′ , ruˆ) Ciphertext size (bytes) DFR
1024
(8,q) 2176 ≈ 2−474
(8,512) 1536 ≈ 2−75
(8,256) 1408 ≈ 2−20
(8,128) 1280 ≈ 2−1
(4,512) 1408 ≈ 2−99
(4,256) 1280 ≈ 2−11
(4,128) 1152 ≈ 2−1
512
(8,q) 1088 ≈ 2−431
(8,512) 768 ≈ 2−33
(8,256) 704 ≈ 2−7
(4,1024) 768 ≈ 2−43
(4,512) 704 ≈ 2−15
used with various compression rates given in Table 4. The DFR is calculated by
using (14) and the cross-over probability of super channel in Table 3. The target
DFR can be achieved with all the Options 1, 2, and 3 if the coefficients of uˆ are
compressed from 14 bits (ruˆ = q) to 8 bits (ruˆ = 256) when the conventional
compression rate (rv′ = 8) for the coefficients of v
′ is applied. This can reduce
the ciphertext size by 35.3 %. Furthermore, the compression for the coefficients
of uˆ and additional compression for the coefficients of v′, which is Option 2 and
Option 3 used with (4,256), can reduce the ciphertext size by 41.2 % to improve
the bandwidth efficiency while achieving the target DFR. If the goal is to reduce
the ciphertext size by 35.3 %, (4,512) is much better than (8,256) because (4,512)
shows a remarkably lower DFR than (8,256). Especially, because Option 1 used
with (8,512) and (4,512), Option 2 used with (8,512), (8,256), and (4,512), and
Option 3 used with (8,512), (8,256), (4,512), and (4,256) overachieve the target
DFR, this DFR margin can also be exploited to improve security of NewHope
by increasing the noise parameter k.
Table 6 shows the DFR and ciphertext reduction of NewHope with n = 512
when Options 4 is used with various compression rates given in Table 4. (4,512)
is better than the (8,256) because (4,512) and (8,256) reduce the ciphertext
size equally, but (4,512) shows a significantly lower DFR than (8,256). Because
Option 4 used with (8,512), (8,256), (4,1024), and (4,512) overachieves the target
DFR, this DFR margin can be exploited to improve the security of NewHope by
increasing the noise parameter k. We will call the options that overachieve the
target DFR the excellent ECC candidates to be used in the next section.
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Table 5: DFR and ciphertext size of NewHope when Options 1, 2, and 3 are used
with various compression rate when n = 1024.
(rv′ , ruˆ) ECC Option DFR
Ciphertext size
(reduction rate)
(8,512)
Only ATE (NewHope) 2−75
1536 bytes
(29.4%)
Option 1 2−569
Option 2 2−1177
Option 3 2−2000
(8,256)
Only ATE (NewHope) 2−20
1408 bytes
(35.3%)
Option 1 2−151
Option 2 2−317
Option 3 2−467
(8,128)
Only ATE (NewHope) 2−1
1280 bytes
(41.2%)
Option 1 2−5
Option 2 2−8
Option 3 2−2
(4,512)
Only ATE (NewHope) 2−40
1408 bytes
(35.3%)
Option 1 2−302
Option 2 2−620
Option 3 2−1016
(4,256)
Only ATE (NewHope) 2−11
1280 bytes
(41.2%)
Option 1 2−85
Option 2 2−168
Option 3 2−222
(4,128)
Only ATE (NewHope) 2−1
1152 bytes
(47.1%)
Option 1 2−1
Option 2 2−1
Option 3 2−0
4.3 Security Analysis for The Excellent ECC Candidates
The excellent ECC candidates obtained in section 4.2 show excessive DFR per-
formance owing to the properly chosen compression rate and ECC. Such over-
achieved DFR can be exploited to improve the security level of NewHope.
Tables 7 shows the DFR, ciphertext size, and security level, which is esti-
mated at the cost of primal attack and dual attack of NewHope with n = 1024.
Compared with current NewHope with n = 1024, Option 3 used with (8,512)
can improve the security level by 21.5 % and reduce the ciphertext size by 29.4%
while achieving the target DFR 2−140. If we focus on improving the bandwidth
efficiency, Option 3 used with (4,256) improves the security level by 3 % as well
as reduces the ciphertext size by 41.5 % while achieving the target DFR. Op-
tion 3 used with (4,512) and Option 3 used with (8,256) improve the bandwidth
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Table 6: DFR and ciphertext size of NewHope when Option 4 is used with various
compression rate when n = 512.
(rv′ , ruˆ) ECC Option DFR
Ciphertext size
(reduction rate)
(8,512)
Only ATE (NewHope) ≈ 2−33 768 bytes
(29.4 %)Option 4 ≈ 2−1101
(8,256)
Only ATE (NewHope) ≈ 2−7 704 bytes
(35.3 %)Option 4 ≈ 2−295
(8,128)
Only ATE (NewHope) ≈ 2−1 640 bytes
(41.2 %)Option 4 ≈ 2−21
(4,1024)
Only ATE (NewHope) ≈ 2−43 768 bytes
(29.4 %)Option 4 ≈ 2−2842
(4,512)
Only ATE (NewHope) ≈ 2−15 704 bytes
(35.3 %)Option 4 ≈ 2−539
(4,256)
Only ATE (NewHope) ≈ 2−8 640 bytes
(41.2 %)Option 4 ≈ 2−138
efficiency equally, but the former one is better because it improves the security
level by 9.4 % more than latter one.
Tables 8 shows the DFR, ciphertext size, and security level of NewHope with
n = 512. Compared with the current NewHope with n = 512, Option 4 used with
(8,512) can improve the security level by 22.8 % and reduce the ciphertext size by
29.4 % while achieving the target DFR. Additionally, Option 4 used with (4,512)
can improve the security level by 15.8 % and reduce the ciphertext size by 35.3
% while achieving the target DFR. The complexity of the decoding algorithm
(BM algorithm) of BCH codes increases linearly with the number of correctable
errors Ct. Thus, if the decoding complexity of BCH code is important, it is better
to choose Option 1 used with (8,512) or Option 1 used with (4,512).
4.4 Closeness of Centered Binomial Distribution and the
Corresponding Rounded Gaussian Distribution for Various k
The properties of rounded Gaussian distribution ξ are key to the worst-case
to average-case reduction for Ring-LWE. However, since a very high-precision
sampling is required for the rounded Gaussian distribution, NewHope uses the
centered binomial distribution ψk for practical sampling without having rigorous
security proof. It is generally accepted that as the centered binomial distribution
and the rounded Gaussian distribution are closer to each other, NewHope is
regarded as more secure. The closeness of two distribution can be measured
through many methods. Among them, Re´nyi divergence is a well-known method,
which is parameterized by a real a > 1 and defined for two distributions P and
Q as follows.
20 M. Song et al.
Table 7: Improved security level, DFR, and ciphertext size for excellent ECC
candidates for NewHope with n = 1024.
(rv′ ,ruˆ) ECC Option
Ciphertext size
(reduction rate)
k
Classical/Quantum
DFR
Primal [bits] Dual [bits]
(8,q) NewHope 2176 bytes 8 259/235 257/233 ≈ 2−474
(8,512)
Option 1
1536 bytes
(29.4 %)
23 296/268 294/267 ≈ 2−147
Option 2 33 310/281 309/280 ≈ 2−144
Option 3 36 314/285 312/283 ≈ 2−140
(8,256)
Option 1
1408 bytes
(35.3 %)
8 259/235 257/233 ≈ 2−151
Option 2 13 275/249 274/248 ≈ 2−145
Option 3 14 278/252 276/250 ≈ 2−158
(4,512)
Option 1
1408 bytes
(35.3 %)
15 280/254 279/253 ≈ 2−151
Option 2 25 299/271 298/270 ≈ 2−140
Option 3 27 302/274 301/273 ≈ 2−146
(4,256)
Option 2 1280 bytes
(41.2 %)
9 262/238 261/237 ≈ 2−143
Option 3 10 266/241 265/240 ≈ 2−147
Table 8: Improved security level, DFR, and ciphertext size for excellent ECC
candidates for NewHope with n = 512.
(rv′ ,ruˆ) ECC Option
Ciphertext size
(reduction rate)
k
Classical/Quantum
DFR
Primal [bits] Dual [bits]
(8,q) NewHope 1088 bytes 8 112/101 112/101 ≈ 2−431
(8,512) Option 4
768 bytes
(29.4 % reduction)
33 137/124 137/124 ≈ 2−140
(8,256) Option 4
704 bytes
(35.3 % reduction)
13 120/109 119/108 ≈ 2−151
(4,512) Option 4
704 bytes
(35.3 % reduction)
22 129/117 129/117 ≈ 2−145
Ra(P ||Q) =
( ∑
x∈sup(P )
P (x)a
Q(x)a−1
) 1
a−1
(15)
where sup(P ) represents the support of P and Q(x) 6= 0 for x ∈ sup(P ).
We define ξk to be the rounded Gaussian distribution with the variance
σ2 = k/2, which is the distribution of b√k/2 · xe where x follows the standard
normal distribution.
Fig. 8 shows that the Re´nyi divergence (a = 9 is used as in [4]) of the centered
binomial distribution ψk and rounded Gaussian distribution ξk with the same
variance k/2 decreases as k increases. Therefore, an increase in noise parameter k
can quantitatively and qualitatively improve the security of NewHope although
the time complexity increases due to the complexity increase of
∑k−1
i=0 (bi − b′i).
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For NewHope with 𝑘 = 8
Fig. 8: Re´nyi divergence of centered binomial distribution ψk and rounded Gaus-
sian distribution ξk with the same variance k/2 according to k (a = 9).
By applying concatenated coding schemes to NewHope, the target DFR can
be achieved even by using a large noise parameter k, which therefore improves the
security of NewHope due to improved closeness of centered binomial distribution
and the corresponding rounded Gaussian distribution.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, it is shown that the security and bandwidth efficiency of NewHope
can be substantially improved by doing exact noise analysis and adopting proper
concatenated error-correction schemes of ATE and BCH code. In detail, the DFR
of NewHope is recalculated as 2−474 and 2−431 for n = 1024 and n = 512 through
exact noise analysis, and hence it is shown that the DFR of NewHope has been
too conservatively calculated. Since the recalculated DFR is much lower than
the required 2−140, this DFR margin is exploited to improve the security level
of NewHope by 8.5% with little increase in time/space complexity. Also, this
margin is utilized to improve the bandwidth efficiency by 5.9 % with keeping the
time/space complexity of NewHope. Furthermore, by allowing a slight increase
in time/space complexity, the bandwidth efficiency can be improved by 23.5 %
using an additional compression on uˆ while achieving the required DFR.
The ATE of NewHope is simple and robust to the side channel attack, but its
error-correction capability is relatively weak compared with other ECCs. There-
fore, we propose various concatenated coding schemes of ATE and BCH code
to combine the advantages of these two ECCs. From an information-theoretic
viewpoint, ATE and total noise channel can be regarded as a super channel,
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and the security and bandwidth efficiency improvement can be analyzed based
on super channel analysis. By applying selected concatenated coding schemes to
NewHope, the security level can be improved up to 21.5 % and the bandwidth
efficiency can be improved up to 41.2 % by reducing ciphertext size, compared
with the current NewHope with n = 1024. Likewise, the security level can be im-
proved up to 22.8 % and the bandwidth efficiency can be improved up to 35.3 %
by reducing ciphertext size, compared with the current NewHope with n = 512.
Furthermore, by applying concatenated coding schemes to NewHope, the secu-
rity of NewHope can be enhanced by improved closeness of centered binomial
distribution and the corresponding rounded Gaussian distribution the target
DFR can be achieved even by using a large noise parameter k, which therefore
improves However, BCH codes are less robust to the side channel attack than
ATE and have a high implementation complexity. For this reason, several im-
provements are required for BCH codes to be practically used in NewHope or
other lattice-based cryptosystems. Moreover, optimizing ECC parameters will
improve the security and bandwidth efficiency of NewHope.
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